Simulation and Estimation of Nonaddative Hedonic Models by James J. Heckman et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES











This research was supported by NSF-00-99195 to James J. Heckman. We would like to thank Andrew
Chesher, Hidehiko Ichimura and Simon Lee for helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of
the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by James J. Heckman, Rosa Matzkin, and Lars Nesheim.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Simulation and Estimation of Nonadditive Hedonic Models
James J. Heckman, Rosa Matzkin, and Lars Nesheim




Making use of restrictions imposed by equilibrium, theoretical progress has been made on
the nonparametric and semiparametric estimation and identification of scalar additive hedonic
models (Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim, 2002) and scalar nonadditive hedonic models (Heckman,
Matzkin, and Nesheim, 2002). However, little is known about the practical aspects of estimating
such models or of the characteristics of equilibrium in such models. This paper presents
computational and analytical results that fill some of these gaps. We simulate and estimate examples
of equilibrium in the additive hedonic models and provide evidence on the performance of several
estimation techniques. We also simulate examples of equilibria in nonadditive models and provide
evidence on the performance of the nonadditive estimation techniques developed in Heckman,
Matzkin, and Nesheim (2002).
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Hedonic models are general equilibrium frameworks that characterize the
pricing of diﬀerentiated goods, viewed as bundles of attributes, and the de-
mand and supply of those goods (attributes) under diﬀerent assumptions
about preferences and technology. They allow for a systematic economic
analysis of the demand and supply of quality. Quality includes enhancement
of the attributes of a good embodied in a unit of the good (such as the at-
tributes of a house or a car as in Rosen, 1974), characteristics of a job (risk
or unpleasantness as in Tinbergen, 1956, Sattinger 1975, 1980, 1993, and in
Thaler and Rosen, 1975) or the amenities oﬀered by an environmental or
recreational improvement (as in Smith and Huang, 1995 and Banzhaf, Sieg,
Smith, and Walsh, 2000). Understanding the structure of demand in mar-
kets for diﬀerentiated products is a crucial ingredient of models of monopoly
pricing (Wilson, 1993; Rochet and Stole, 2001; and Armstrong, 1996). The
hedonic model underlies general equilibrium analyses of local public goods
(Epple, 1987; Epple and Sieg, 1999; and Bayer, 2000) and models in which
social interactions are priced (Nesheim, 2001). The promise of the hedonic
approach is great. It oﬀers insight into the economics of variety and hetero-
geneity in product quality and worker skill which are hallmark features of
1modern economies. It oﬀers a consistent approach to adjusting price indices
for quality and allowing for valuation of new goods (or environmental oﬀer-
ings) that can be viewed as new packages of old attributes (Lancaster, 1966,
1975; Triplett, 2000; or the essays in Bresnahan and Gordon, 1997). With
hedonic models, it is possible to interpret wage data on heterogeneous labor,
to evaluate alternative policy proposals for workplace safety (as in Kniesner
and Leeth, 1988, 1995), to evaluate proposals to subsidize education and job
training (Teulings and van Rens, 2002; and Tinbergen, 1956), and to examine
their consequences for worker and ￿rm welfare and for wage inequality.
The potential applications of hedonic models are myriad but their appli-
cation and development, except in certain special cases, have been hindered
by computational diﬃculties, approximations that ignore the implications
of equilibrium in the hedonic model, and the widely held belief that iden-
ti￿cation of the structural parameters in a hedonic model is not possible
using data from a single market. Recent theoretical progress has been made
in understanding these issues making use of restrictions imposed by equi-
librium. Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2002) and Heckman, Matzkin,
and Nesheim (2002) have shown that contrary to the widely held belief that
identi￿cation is impossible in a single market, nonparametric and semipara-
2metric estimation and identi￿cation of scalar additive hedonic models (Eke-
land, Heckman, and Nesheim, 2002) and scalar nonadditive hedonic models
(Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim, 2003) is possible.
However, little is known about the practical aspects of estimating such
models or of the characteristics of equilibrium in these two classes of models.
This paper presents computational and analytical results that ￿ll these gaps.
We simulate and estimate examples of equilibrium in these classes of hedonic
models and provide evidence on the performance of several estimation tech-
niques. The simulations show the shapes of the pricing function that result
from various assumptions about the underlying structural parameters in the
economy. The estimation results demonstrate that structural parameters in
an additive economy can be precisely estimated. In addition, these results
demonstrate that in a nonadditive economy nonparametric techniques can
be used to recover estimates of the structural parameters.
In section 2 we present the general hedonic model. In section 4 we discuss
identi￿cation of the model and conditions suﬃcient for identi￿cation in the
additive and nonadditive cases. In section 5 we discuss estimation of the
model based on the earlier results. In section 6 we present simulation and
estimation results before concluding in section 7.
32 General Hedonic Model
We ￿rst present a general statement of the classical hedonic model. For speci-
￿c i t y ,c o n s i d e ral a b o rm a r k e ts e t t i n g .O ur analysis applies more generally,
but it is useful to have a speci￿c example in hand. Assume a static model.
Consumers (workers) match to single worker ￿rms. Workers are heteroge-
neous. They have characteristics (x,ε)w h e r ex ∈ X ⊆ Rnx and ε ∈ E ⊆ Rnε
are observable and unobservable (to the econometrician) characteristics that
aﬀect their utility from diﬀerent job types. Firms are also heterogeneous.
They have characteristics (y,η)w h e r ey ∈ Y ⊆ Rny and η ∈ H ⊆ Rnη are
observable and unobservable characteristics that aﬀect the output and pro￿ts
they obtain from diﬀerent job types. Job types have characteristics z ∈ Z
where Z ⊆ Rnz.Zis the set of feasible job types. For example, z could be
a (possibly multidimensional) measure of the riskiness of the job. Alterna-
tively, in a housing market setting, z could be a vector of characteristics of
a neighborhood or a house. We focus attention on the classical case where
nz = nε = nη assuming a smooth equilibrium pricing function. This is the
hedonic model analyzed in Tinbergen (1956), Rosen (1974), Epple (1987)
and Kniesner and Leeth (1988, 1995). It is also the example that has dom-
inated much of the literature on hedonic models. The theoretical analysis,
4the simulation models, and the empirical results to follow in sections 4 and 6
restrict the analysis further and focus on the scalar hedonic model in which
nz =1 .
The distribution of consumer characteristics in the population is charac-
terized by the density functions fx and fε both strictly greater than zero in
the interiors of X and E respectively. We assume x is independent of ε. Sim-
ilarly, the distribution of ￿rm characteristics are characterized by the density
functions fy and fη also strictly positive in the interiors of their respective
supports. y is independent of ε.
Workers of type (x,ε) choose jobs of type z to maximize utility. P(z)i s
the earnings of workers supplying attribute vector z, which is a disamenity.
To focus on the main ideas, we study the quasilinear utility model (also
known as the transferable utility model in the assignment literature and in
the theoretical public economics literature. See Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame,
1999 and Wooders, 1994). De￿ne U∗(c,z,x,ε)=c−U (z,x,ε)w h e r ex and ε
are as de￿ned above and c is consumption. For simplicity assume c = P(z),
so workers consume their earnings. More generally, c = P (z)+R where
R is non-labor income, but for ease of exposition, assume R =0 . Workers
who don￿t work get reservation utility V0. We initially restrict our analysis
5to economies for which the equilibrium price function is smooth. Similar
analyses can be done for economies in which the equilibrium price function
is not smooth. Smoothness is not a generic property of hedonic models,
even when the underlying preferences are smooth.1 Given P(z), a twice
continuously diﬀerentiable price function, and assuming the utility function
is twice diﬀerentiable, for those who choose to work we obtain the following
￿rst order conditions for a maximum
Pz (z) − Uz (z,x,ε)=0 . (1)
The second order conditions (SOC) require that Pzz0 − Uzz0 be negative def-
inite. Assuming the SOC are satis￿ed and using the Implicit Function The-
orem, (1) determines z = s(x,ε), the quality of the good supplied by each
worker (x,ε). Assuming Uzε0 is invertible it also determines the inverse map-
ping ε = e s(z,x). Note that e s(z,x) implicitly depends on the marginal price
function Pz (z). The two mappings s(x,ε)a n de s(z,x) are the focus of both
our theoretical and empirical study of the classical hedonic model.
Firms of type (y,η) demand attribute z and maximize pro￿ts which are
1For examples of sorting problems with non-smooth pricing functions see Wilson (1993),
Nesheim (2001), and Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2002).
6equal to output Γ(z,y,η) minus production costs P (z)w h e r ey and η are de-
￿ned above. We assume that the production function is twice diﬀerentiable.
If the ￿rm hires no workers, reservation pro￿ts are Π0. Otherwise, pro￿ts
are Π(z,y,η,P (z)) = Γ(z,y,η) − P(z)a n dt h e￿rst order conditions for a
maximum of each ￿rm that enters the market are
Γz (z,y,η) − Pz (z)=0 ( 2 )
The second order conditions require that Γzz0 −Pzz0 be negative de￿nite.
Assuming the SOC are satis￿ed and using the Implicit Function Theorem, (2)
de￿nes z = d(y,η), the type of job demanded by each ￿rm (y,η). Assuming
Γzε0 is invertible, it also determines the inverse mapping η = e d(z,y). As on
the supply side, e d(z,y) implicitly depends on the marginal price function
Pz (z).
In equilibrium, the density of the demanded z must equal the density of
the supplied z for all values of z. To express this condition in terms of the
primitive functions, consider the transformation de￿ned by the consumer ￿rst













. Assuming that all potential workers
7actually work, this transformation induces a density of consumers supplying
each type of job z. Thus, the Supply Density is
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Analogous arguments produce the density of z demanded. Consider the














. Assuming that all ￿rms
enter the market, this transformation induces a density of demand for every













Equilibrium in hedonic markets requires that demand and supply be
equated at each point of the support of z. So, equilibrium prices must satisfy
the following second order diﬀerential equation in P(z)
Z
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8Observe that e s(z,x)a n de d(z,y) implicitly depend on Pz and Pzz0. In
addition, the solution depends on the structural parameters of the model:
technology of the ￿rms Γ, the utility function U of the workers, and the dis-
tributions of ￿rms and workers in the population (fx,f ε,f y,f η). Economic
theory implies that marginal products and marginal utilities are nonnega-
tive in most cases. In order for agents to participate in the market, ￿rms
and workers must receive wages and pro￿ts above reservation levels. If not,
equation (3) must be suitably adjusted. These criteria generate the bound-
ary conditions that determine the solution of the diﬀerential equation for
equilibrium prices.
Equations (1), (2), and (3) and the data generated by them are the focus
of our analysis. They determine all the theoretical and statistical properties
of the model. In general, equations like (3) have no closed form solution,
except for the special case of the Tinbergen model, which is developed below
that is not identi￿ed in a single cross section. While progress has been made
in understanding such equations in the mathematics and numerical analysis
literature little is known about their solutions in economics.2 The inability
to compute or even characterize the equilibria from this model even in the
2Notable exceptions include Kniesner and Leeth (1995), Teulings (1995), and Nesheim
(2001).
9cases of a scalar attribute has inhibited application of the hedonic model
to economic problems. It has also hindered understanding of the statistical
properties of hedonic models relevant to identi￿cation and estimation. Our
simulations presented in section 6 help remedy this problem. We ￿rst present
the Tinbergen model which implicitly or explicitly has been the point of
departure for all empirical work on hedonics.
3 Tinbergen￿s Linear-Quadratic Model
Assume preferences are quadratic in z and linear in c, unearned income R =
0, and that individual heterogeneity (x,ε)o n l ya ﬀects utility through the







The conditions determining a consumer maximum are
Pz + θ − Az =0
3The model in this example was ￿rst analyzed by Tinbergen (1956) and has been used
by Epple (1987) and Tauchen and Witte (2001) among others.
10where Pzz0 −A is negative de￿nite. On the ￿rm side, assume the production
function is quadratic in z and that ￿rm heterogeneity only aﬀects pro￿ts
through the single index ν = µν (y)+η where dim(ν)=d i m( z). Pro￿ts are





0Bz − P (z)
and the conditions determining a ￿rm￿s optimum are
ν − Bz − Pz =0
where −(B + Pzz0)i sn e g a t i v ed e ￿nite. The distributions of θ and ν in
the population are normal. The distribution of θ is θ ∼ N(µθ,Σθ), and the
distribution of ν is ν ∼ N(µν,Σν).
An arbitrary price function induces a density of demand and a density of
supply at every location z. The equilibrium price function can be found by
equating these densities at every point z and solving the diﬀerential equation
(3). However, in the linear-quadratic-normal case one can correctly guess that








11and then ￿nd the coeﬃcients (π0,π1,π 2) that satisfy the equilibrium equa-
tion. Assuming the price function is quadratic, the ￿rst order condition for
ac o n s u m e ri s
π1 + π2z + θ − Az =0 . (4)
For a ￿rm, it is
ν − Bz − π1 − π2z =0 . (5)
The second order conditions require that both A−π2 and B+π2 are positive
de￿nite. Thus we may solve for z from (4) to obtain
z =( A − π2)
−1(θ + π1)( 6 )
and from (5) to obtain
z =( B + π2)
−1(ν − π1). (7)
These equations de￿ne mappings from workers θ and ￿rms ν to job types
z. These mappings determine the density of supply and demand at every
location and the types of workers and ￿rms at every location. Equilibrium
is characterized by a vector π1 and a matrix π2 that equate demand and
12supply at all z. However, since both θ and ν are normally distributed, this
only requires equating the mean and variance of supply and demand.
The mean supply ES (z) is obtained from (4):
(Average Supply) ES (z)=( A − π2)
−1 E (θ + π1)
The mean demand is obtained from (7):
(Average Demand) ED (z)=( B + π2)
−1 E (ν − π1)
Since µθ = E(θ)a n dµν = E(ν), the condition ES(z)=ED(z)i m p l i e st h a t
(Equality of means) (A − π2)
−1 (µθ + π1)=( B + π2)
−1 (µν − π1) .
Rearranging terms, we obtain an explicit expression for π1 in terms of A,B,µθ,µ ν
and π2 :
π1 =[ ( A − π2)
−1 +( B + π2)
−1]
−1[−(A − π2)
−1µθ +( B + π2)
−1 µν].
To determine π2, compute the variances of supply and demand from (4)
13and (7) respectively to obtain:
Σ
S





z =( B + π2)
−1Σν (B + π2)
−1
where ΣS
z i st h ev a r i a n c eo fs u p p l ya n dΣD
z is the variance of demand. From
equality of variances of the demand and supply distributions we obtain an
implicit equation for π2 :
(Equality of variances) (A − π2)−1Σθ(A − π2)−1 =( B + π2)−1Σν(B + π2)−1 .
We pin down initial conditions using the restrictions that U ≥ ﬂ U, a reser-
vation value, and pro￿ts are positive (Π ≥ 0). Equilibrium pro￿ts as a
function of location are
1
2
z0(B + π2)z − π0. Hence nonnegativity of pro￿ts
implies −π0 ≥ 0s i n c e( B + π2) is positive de￿nite by the second order con-
ditions. Setting reservation utility equal to zero, a similar argument on the
worker side implies π0 ≥ 0. Hence π0 =0 .
Once we have solved for π1 and π2, (4) and (7) also de￿ne the equilib-
rium matching function linking the characteristics of suppliers (θ)t ot h o s e
14of demanders (ν). For each z, this function is
(A − π2)
−1(θ + π1)=( B + π2)
−1(ν − π1).
Thus, the equilibrium relationship between θ and ν is
θ =( A − π2)(B + π2)
−1(ν − π1) − π1. (8)
This relationship has important empirical implications as noted by Epple
(1987) and Kahn and Lang (1988). Conditional on location choice, worker
and ￿rm characteristics are not statistically independent in equilibrium. There
is a functional relationship between them.
In the separable case where Σθ, Σν,A ,and B are diagonal, π2 is diagonal.
Eﬀectively, this is a scalar case. In the scalar case, equality of variances
implies that (A − π2)2Σν =( B + π2)2Σθ. Since the second order conditions
imply that A−π2 > 0a n dB+π2 > 0. De￿ning σθ =( Σθ)
1













π2, the curvature of the price function, is a weighted average of the curvatures
of workers￿ and ￿rms￿ preference and technology functions. π1 is a weighted
a v e r a g eo ft h em e a n so fw o r k e ra n d￿rm distributions of heterogenity. In
both cases, the weights depend on the relative variances of worker and ￿rm
heterogeneity. If workers are much more heterogeneous than ￿rms σθ >> σν,
π2 will approximately equal B, the curvature of ￿rms￿ technology. If σθ = σν
and A = B, π2 = 0 is a solution and the equilibrium price function is linear in
z. If σθ = σν, but A 6= B, then π2 =
A − B
2
. In the polar cases when σθ =0
or σν = 0 then there is eﬀectively only one type of consumer or one type of
￿rm respectively. If σθ =0a n dσν > 0, then π2 = A and π1 = −µθ. Then
prices reveal the parameters of consumer preferences. If σν =0a n dσθ > 0,
π2 = B and π1 = µν. These two polar cases are discussed in Rosen (1974).
Only in these two polar cases do prices directly reveal consumer preferences
or ￿rm productivities respectively. Similar results hold when z, θ, and ν are
vectors. We next turn to an analysis of identi￿cation in the general hedonic
model.
164I d e n t i ￿cation
The most direct approach to estimating hedonic models is to solve the sec-
ond order diﬀerential equation (3) implied by equilibrium for P(z)i nt e r m s
of the parameters of preferences, technology and the distributions of tastes
and productivity and to jointly estimate the demand function corresponding
to (2), the supply function corresponding to (1) and the distributions of un-
observable preference and technology heterogeneity (fη and fε) exploiting all
of the information in the equilibrium conditions including data on demand,
supply and the pricing function.
Rosen (1974) suggested an intuitively plausible and computationally sim-
pler two step estimation procedure that has been widely criticized. In step
1 of his procedure, the analyst estimates P(z)f r o mm a r k e td a t a . I ns t e p
2, the analyst uses ￿rst order conditions in conjunction with the marginal
prices obtained from step 1 to recover preferences and technology respec-
tively. Suppose that consumer and ￿rm ￿rst order conditions (1) and (2) are
linear and z is a scalar. These are exactly the ￿rst order conditions (4) and
(5) of the Tinbergen model. (The scalar assumption is made only to simplify
the argument and is not essential.) In this case, for the consumers, equation
17(1) would be of the form
Pz (z) − Az + θ0 + θ
0
1x + ε =0 ( 9 )
For the ￿rms, equation (2) would be of the form
−Bz + ν0 + ν
0
1y + η − Pz (z)=0 ( 1 0 )
Suppose further that the pricing function is quadratic as in Tinbergen (1956).
Then the ￿rst stage of Rosen￿s procedure would be to estimate the pricing
function P(z)=π0 + π1z + 1
2π2z2 and recover estimates of b π1 and b π2 (￿￿￿
denotes estimate) and the marginal prices b Pz (z)=b π1 + b π2z. The second
stage substitutes the estimated prices into (9) and (10) and estimates the
curvature parameters: Thus, Rosen proposed to estimate B and ν1 from the
least squares regression
b Pz(z)=￿ π1 +￿ π2z = ν0 + ν
0
1y − Bz + η. (11)
18A parallel proposal for preferences estimates A and θ1 from the regression
b Pz(z)=￿ π1 +￿ π2z = −θ0 − θ
0
1x + Az − ε. (12)
James Brown and Harvey Rosen (1982) analyze this method. They interpret
(11) and (12) as linearized approximations to the general ￿rst order condi-
tions for the model. The linear-quadratic-normal model of Tinbergen (1956)
is the framework in which these approximations are exact.
In this approximation interpretation, the distributions of η and ε are kept
in the background. Standard linear econometric methods are applied to iden-
tify the parameters of (11) and (12) and connections among the parameters
of preferences, technology and the distributions of tastes and productivity
are not made explicit. Issues of identi￿cation are confused with issues of es-
timation. Common to an entire genre of empirical economics, this literature
focuses on ￿nding ￿good instruments￿ and misses basic sources of identi￿ca-
tion in hedonic models.
Starting from (11) and (12), Brown and Rosen (1982) make three points
that have been reiterated in the subsequent empirical literature. Point One:
Identi￿cation Can Only Be Obtained Through Arbitrary Functional Form
19Assumptions. Since z is on both sides of (11) and (12), by a property of
least squares, a regression using the constructed price b Pz(z)=￿ π1 +￿ π2z as
the dependent variable in (11) or(12) only identi￿es π2. In general, π2 does
not identify any technology or preference parameter. In the special cases
where there is no variation in preference parameters ε or where there is no
dispersion in η, π2 identi￿es preference (A) or production parameters (B)
respectively (See Rosen, 1974 or Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim, 2002).
However, if the constructed price is a nonlinear function of z, this ar-
gument no longer holds. The nonlinear variation in b Pz (z)g i v e sa na d d e d
piece of information that can help to identify technology and preference pa-
rameters. This identi￿cation strategy works because it rules out collinearity
between z and b Pz (z), but such nonlinearity is widely viewed as an arti￿cial
source of identi￿cation that is thought to be ￿arbitrary.￿ Theorem 1 in Eke-
land, Heckman, and Nesheim (2002) proves that this nonlinearity is a generic
property of equilibrium in the hedonic model. In a parametric framework,
Nesheim (2001) shows that nonlinearity is a robust feature of a hedonic econ-
omy with social interactions. In the context of the Tinbergen economy, this
nonlinearity is generic.
Point Two: Endogeneity. Even if such ￿arbitrary￿ assumptions are made,
20so that one can use the nonlinearity in b Pz (z) to help identify the parameters
and circumvent Point One, one still faces standard endogeneity problems. z
is correlated with η and ε in (11) and (12) respectively. Moreover, exclusion
restrictions from the other side of the market cannot be justi￿ed. The equilib-




so that conditional on z there is a functional and statistical dependence con-
necting ε, η, z and the regressors. Conditional on z, η, ε, x and y become
stochastically dependent even if in the underlying population initially they
are mutually independent.
With data from a single market, one is forced to hunt for ￿clever￿ instru-
ments with a questionable economic basis. Thus, even if ￿arbitrary￿ non-
linearities are invoked, standard instruments may be lacking. In Ekeland,
Heckman, and Nesheim (2002) we show that the economics of the model
guarantees valid instruments even though there are no exclusion restrictions.
In the particular case of equation (10), when Pz (z) is nonlinear, E (z|y)
is not a linear function of y and so can be used as an instrument for z in
this equation. Hence, generically, E (z|y) is a valid instrument for z. This is
discussed at more length below and holds more generally.
Point Three: Use of Multimarket Data. R o s e n( 1 9 7 4 ) ,B r o w na n dR o s e n
21(1982), Epple (1987), and Kahn and Lang (1988) consider estimation of the
￿rst order conditions using multimarket data either across regions or across
time in the same region. In this case, if we assume that preference parameters
common across agents remain constant across markets while distributions
of individual heterogeneity vary across markets, we can use cross market
variation in prices and location choices to estimate the common preference
parameters. However, this identi￿cation strategy relies on assumptions that
can be tested if hedonic models can be identi￿ed in a single market. Using
the techniques we discuss later in this paper, the structure of hedonic models
can be estimated and identi￿e du s i n gd a t af r o mas i n g l em a r k e tf o rac l a s s
of additive parametric structures that includes the linear model as a special
case.
Our results invalidate the interpretation that has been given to Brown
and Rosen￿s criticism. What has been interpreted as an identi￿cation failure
is in fact the failure of an estimation procedure, coupled with an approach
that disregards basic sources of identi￿cation and mainly focuses on ￿nding
exclusion restrictions. In Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2002) and in
Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2002) we show that when there are no
unobservable attributes and some structure is put on preferences and tech-
22nologies, everything can be identi￿ed up to normalizations using single mar-
ket data. In particular, Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2002) show that
putting an additive structure on preferences is suﬃcient for identi￿cation.
We describe these results in the next section. Alternatively, if the additive
structure is too restrictive or is rejected by the data, Heckman, Matzkin, and
Nesheim (2002) shows that in the nonadditive case alternative assumptions
on preferences can lead to identi￿cation. We describe these results in section
4.2. Both sets of results consider the case where z is unidimensional.
4.1 Identi￿cation of the additive model
To show that the preferences and technologies generating an hedonic equilib-
rium price function can be identi￿ed up to normalizations, using single mar-
ket data and without any exclusion restrictions, suppose that z is one dimen-
sional. Assume further that for unknown functions Mf and nf, the produc-
tion function, Γ(z,y,η), of a typical ￿rm is Γ(z,y,η)=Mf(z)+znf (y)+zη.
The ￿rms￿ ￿rst order condition for pro￿t maximization (2) becomes
Pz (z)=mf(z)+nf (y)+η (13)
23where mf (z)=∂Mf (z)/∂z, and the second order condition is ∂mf (z)/∂z−
Pzz(z) < 0. This is a special case of (2) and is a signi￿cant generalization of
(10); it reduces to (10) when mf and nf are linear functions.
In a parallel manner, we may assume that the marginal utility is also of
an additive form. The ￿rst order condition (1) of the worker becomes
Pz (z)=mw (z)+nw (x)+ε
for some unknown functions mw and nw. These equations are the empirical
equations we seek to estimate and the equations that generate the equilibrium
of the model through equation (3).
In the empirical analysis, we focus on the ￿rms￿ equation. The analysis
is analogous for the workers. We have a dataset with observations on N
￿rms drawn at random from a single market. For each ￿rm, we observe the
vector (Pz (z),z,y). These data are generated from the equilibrium of a single
hedonic market. This implies that for each ￿rm, equation (13) holds where
η is unobservable to the econometrician, and mf (z),n f (y), and Fη, the
distribution of η, are to be estimated. We assume Pz (z)i sk n o w nt of o c u so n
t h ei s s u eo fi d e n t i ￿cation and estimation of the structural parameters. In all
24cases if Pz (z) is unknown because there is measurement error in prices, then
a two stage procedure can be implemented a la Rosen (1974). First, estimate
Pz (z), then proceed to estimate (13) replacing the true price slope with the
estimated slope. Alternatively, (13) and the equilibrium price equation (3)
can be estimated simultaneously.
Much of the identi￿cation analysis is conducted independently of the
equilibrium equation (3); it studies the conditional cumulate distribution
function (CDF) of z implied by (13) and in particular makes use of the
transformation function5
T (z)=Pz (z) − mf (z).
In terms of this function, the CDF of z is
Fz|y (z,y)=Fη (T (z) − nf (y)) (14)
where Fz|y (z,y) is the CDF of conditional on y e v a l u a t e da tt h ep o i n t( z,y)
and Fη is the CDF of η. Diﬀerentiating (14) with respect to z and yi, the i0th
5See Horowitz (1996).
25component of the vector y, we have
∂Fz|y (z,y)
∂z






































This implies that hi (z,y)=h0 + h1 (z)+h2 (y)a ss h o w ni nE k e l a n d ,H e c k -
man, and Nesheim (2002) and further that








for some R1,K 1,.and C0. Since h0,h 1,a n dh2 can be estimated by estimating
the CDF b Fz|y the functions T (z)a n dnf can be estimated up to the three
unknown constants. This in turn determines mf (z)=Pz−T (z). Fixing the
constants and ￿xing y,t h eC D Fo fη can then be estimated as
b Fη (e)=b Fz|y (z (e),y)( 1 8 )
where z (e)s a t i s ￿es
e = −R1 − K1
z(e) Z
0




Thus, the parameters mf (z),n f (y), and Fη (η) are identi￿ed up to the
constants R1,K 1, and C0. The derivation of this results suggests an estima-
tion procedure. First estimate Fz|y and calculate hi (z,y). Then using Pz (z)
and the de￿nition of T (z), recover mf,n y, and Fη from (16), (17), and (18).
We develop this further in the next section.
The above procedure leaves the 3 constants undetermined. Additionally,
we can recover the parameter K1 if more information is available. If for
27example, total output of the ￿rm is observable, this information can be used
to recover an estimate of K1. This is developed further in Ekeland, Heckman,
and Nesheim (2002). Alternatively, if it is known that mf (z) belongs to a
known ￿nite dimensional vector space V so that mf (z)=
M P
j=1
θjξj (z)w h e r e
ξj are the basis functions of the vector space, then we can go one step further
and recover the unknown parameter K1.
To see this,de￿ne e T (z)=
z R
0
exp(h1 (s))ds. Then using (16) and the de￿-





θjξj (z) − R1
K1
. (19)
Theorem 2 in Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2002) proves that generically
Pz (z)d o e sn o tb e l o n gt oV. That is, generically Pz (z) is linearly independent
of mf (z). A sar e s u l t ,ar e g r e s s i o no fe T (z)o nPz (z), a constant, and the
functions ξj for j =1 ,...,M will recover K1.
This procedure suggests a two step estimator for K1. First estimate e T (z)
a n dt h e nr u nt h er e g r e s s i o no fe T (z)o nPz (z),ξ j, and a constant. b K1 is
the inverse of the coeﬃcient on Pz (z). Our experience with this estimator
to date is unfavorable. We develop an alternative estimator in section 5.1
that estimates a semiparametric version of the model using semiparametric
28maximum likelihood where the Monte Carlo results are much better.
4.2 Identi￿cation of the nonadditive model
Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2002) have shown that to be able to iden-
tify the preferences and technologies generating an hedonic equilibrium price
function, it is not necessary that the marginal utility and marginal product
functions be additive functions of the types speci￿ed in Section 4.1. Under
certain conditions, one can identify nonadditive marginal utilities and nonad-
ditive marginal product functions, using single market data and no exclusion
restrictions. Nonadditive speci￿cations for either of these marginal functions
are capable of generating a much richer set of equilibria, such as, for example,
equilibria exhibiting bunching. Hence, it is important to be able to allow for
these more ￿exible types of speci￿cations when estimating preferences and
technologies.
Since the arguments for the identi￿cation and estimation of the marginal
product function are analogous to those used to establish the identi￿cation
of the marginal utility function, we will discuss only the latter. From the
analysis in Section 2, it follows that from the ￿rst and second order condi-
tions of pro￿t maximization by a worker, we can establish the existence of
29a supply function z = s(x,ε), where z denotes the quality or type of labor
supplied by a worker with observable characteristic x and unobservable char-
acteristic ε. The function s is strictly increasing in ε if Uzε < 0. Assume, as
in the previous sections, that ε is distributed independently of x, then by the
arguments introduced in Matzkin (1999), and further developed in Matzkin
(2003), it follows that, subject to some normalizations, the function s and
the distribution of ε can be nonparametrically identi￿ed from the conditional
distribution of z given x. Knowledge of the function s and of the distribution
of ε, together with knowledge of Pz, allow one to identify the marginal utility
function, from the ￿rst order conditions of utility maximization. This last
step requires a separability restriction on the marginal utility function, of the
type studied in Matzkin (2002, 2003).
To present one such set of separability restrictions and normalizations,
suppose that for some unknown function m, which is strictly increasing in
its ￿rst argument and strictly decreasing in its second argument
Uz (z,x,ε)=m(q(z,x),ε)
where q is a known function, which is strictly increasing in each argument.
30Normalize the values of the unknown function m, by requiring that for some
value x of x, and for all t
m(q(t,x),t)=Pz (t)
Then, as it is shown in Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2002), under these
restrictions and normalizations, both the distribution of ε and the function
m, are nonparametrically identi￿ed from the conditional distribution of z
given x.
The weak separability restriction in Uz allows one to recover the marginal
utility when the supply function is given. The normalization that ￿xes the
value of the function m at one point of x allows one to recover the supply
function s and the distribution of ε from the conditional distribution of z
given x. To see this last point, note that the normalization restriction together
with the ￿rst order conditions imply that for all ε
s(x,ε)=ε
31since, when x = x and z = ε
Uz (ε,x,ε)=m(q(ε,x),ε)=Pz (ε).
The strict monotonicity of s in ε and the statistical independence between x
and ε, imply that, for all values of x and ε,
Fε (e)=P r( ε ≤ e)=P r( ε ≤ e|x)=P r( s(x,ε) ≤ s(x,e))
and that
Pr(s(x,ε) ≤ s(x,e)) = Pr(z ≤ s(x,e)|x)=Fz|x (s(x,e)).
Letting x = x, this implies that
Fε (e)=Fz|x (s(x,e)) = Fz|x (e)
Hence, we can recover the distribution of ε from the conditional distribution
of z given x = x. Next, since for all x and e, Fε (e)=Fz|x (s(x,e)), it follows
32that, under conditions guaranteeing that Fz|x is strictly increasing,
s(x,e)=F
−1







Hence, we can recover the function s from the conditional distribution of z
given x. (See Matzkin (2003) for details.)
To see that under the separability restriction, the function m is identi￿ed,










it follows that, from knowledge of the function s and of the marginal price
function, we can recover the function m, which gives the values of the marginal
utility function (See Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2002) for details).
Estimation of the function m and the distribution of ε follows the steps
33d e s c r i b e da b o v ea n di sd e t a i l e di ns e c t i o n5 . 2 .
5E s t i m a t i o n
Several estimation techniques are available to implement the analysis pre-
sented in sections 4.1 and 4.2. All make use of the structure that the additive
and nonadditive models impose on Fz|y. In the case of the nonadditive model,
a fully nonparametric estimator is described in section 5.2. In the case of
the additive model, this information is suﬃcient to identify the structural
parameters up to location and scale. Additionally, if parametric restrictions
are placed on mf (z) in the additive model, the generic nonlinearity of the
hedonic model can be exploited to estimate the scale. To show how this
scale parameter can be estimated and for ease of exposition in developing
an estimator and presenting the estimation results for the additive model,
we focus on a semiparametric estimator that exploits knowledge of the func-
tional forms of mf (z)a n dnf (y) but which makes no further assumptions on
the distribution of η. This estimator is semiparametric in that mf and nf are
k n o w nu pt oa￿nite dimensional parameter set while the distribution of η is
unknown. We also restrict the exposition to the case where the dimension of
34y is 1. We develop this estimator for the additive model in the next section.
5.1 Estimation of the additive model
In our limited Monte Carlo investigations, we generate data from and develop
an estimator for speci￿cations of mf (z)a n dnf (y)i n( 1 3 )t h a ta r el i n e a ri n









j + η. (23)
We assume that a random sample of data on (Pz (zn),P zz (zn),z n,y n)f o r
n =1 ,...,N are available for a single market. To focus on the estimation of
preferences or technology we assume that Pz (z)a n dPzz (z)a r ek n o w n . I f
instead prices were observed measured with error, the technique described
below would need to be augmented to allow for estimation of the pricing
function. The technique exploits all the information in the model and uses
the generic nonlinearity in the model to identify not only the shape of the




βizi and nf (y)=
Nν P
j=0
νjyj, the density of the n0th
35observation zn conditional on yn is


































is the kernel density estimator of fη. We propose to estimate the parameters
by maximizing the likelihood function for the sample.
Let β and ν be the vectors of parameters excluding β0 and ν0.T h e










































































It is immediately obvious that β0 and ν0 are not identi￿ed; they drop out
of the expression for ξkn. W ei g n o r et h e mi nt h er e s to ft h ed i s c u s s i o n . I t
is also immediate that the parameters β are identi￿ed if and only if Pz (z)
is not a polynomial of degree less than or equal to Nzf. Theorem (1) in
Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2002) guarantees that generically the slope
parameters in β are identi￿ed. The maximum likelihood estimators of β and ν





0f o ra l ln. An estimator of fη is
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375.2 Estimation of the nonadditive model
T h em o s td i r e c tp r o c e d u r et oe s t i m a t et h ef u n c t i o nm and of the distri-
bution of ε in the nonadditive model follows the steps described in section
4.2. First, Fz|x is estimated nonparametrically using data on the joint dis-
tribution of (z,x). this nonparametric estimator is b Fz|x Then this estima-







. Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2002) have
















where K is a kernel function, e K is the integral of a kernel function, and σ is
a bandwidth, the estimators for the distribution of ε and for the function m
are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. Finally, using this
estimator b s(x,ε), data on the marginal price Pz (z), and equations (21) and
(22),mis estimated as
m(t1,t 2)=Pz (b s(x
∗,t 2)) (24)
38where x∗ solves q(b s(x∗,t 2),x ∗)=t1.
6 Simulation and estimation results
In this section, we present simulation results from a range of speci￿cations
of 3 basic hedonic models. In each case, these simulations show the shape of
the equilibrium pricing function, the population density at each point z, and
the generic nonlinearity of the hedonic model. The accompanying estimation
results demonstrate the performance of the estimation techniques described
in sections 5.1 and 5.2.
Models 1 and 2 are examples of additive hedonic models. For these models
we study the equilibria for several sets of parameter values and study how
the shape of the equilibrium price varies with alternate parameter values.
Then we simulate data from these sample hedonic economies and test the
performance of the estimation techniques on the simulated data. For each
model we simulate data from 15 parameter speci￿cations. For each speci￿-
cation, we generate 100 independent samples each with 1000 observations.
Using these simulated data, we estimate the parameters using the technique
described in section 5.1. The mean and the variance of the parameter es-
39timates are compared with the true parameter values used to generate the
simulated data.
Model 3 is an example of a nonadditive hedonic model. The estimation
technique that is used to estimate the parameters of the additive models is
not applicable to data generated from the nonadditive economy. Instead,
the technique from section 5.2 must be used. For model 3, we simulate data
from a sample economy and study the performance of the nonadditive model
estimator described in section 5.2.
All models are completely speci￿ed by the ￿rms￿ technology Γ(z,y,η),
the workers￿ utility U (z,x,ε), and the distributions of ￿rm and worker het-
erogeneity fy,f η,f x, and fε. For each model, these objects are speci￿ed and
then standard numerical methods are used to approximate Pz (z)t h es o l u -
tion to the equilibrium diﬀerential equation (3). Throughout the exposition
below φ(x,µ,Σ) denotes the density function of a normal random variable
with mean µ and covariance Σ. Model 1 is a quadratic model with non-
normal heterogeneity. Model 2 is an additive model in which mf,n f,m w,
and nw are low degree polynomials. For both models we discuss features of
the equilibrium price function, simulate data, and estimate the structural
parameters describing ￿rm technologies. Model 3 is a nonadditive model in
40which ￿rms are homogenous and workers have Cobb-Douglas utility. It is
described further below.
6.1 Model 1: Speci￿cation and simulation results
The simplest generalization of the normal-quadratic Tinbergen model is the
quadratic hedonic model with non-normal heterogeneity. This model speci-
￿cation imposes Nzf =1a n dNν = 1 in equation (23) and in the analogous
equation for workers. However, in contrast to the classical Tinbergen model,
this model allows the heterogeneity parameters to be distributed as a mix-
ture of normals. Details of model 1 are given in Table A1 in appendix A.
This table details the exact functional forms that describe the model.
For this model, preliminary investigations simulated pricing functions for
a large number of speci￿cations. In all of these speci￿cations, parameters
were restricted to cases where worker and ￿rm heterogeneity were distributed
as mixtures of normals each with two components in the mixture. The ex-
treme cases of these speci￿cations include the Tinbergen-normal case when
the weights on the two components of the mixture are 0 and 1 or 1 and 0. In
this set of speci￿cations the parameters that most aﬀected the shape of the
pricing function were the mean and variance of worker and ￿rm heterogeneity
41and the weights on the components of the mixture of normals distribution.
In all cases the curvature of the pricing function is a linear combination of
the curvatures of worker preferences and ￿rm technologies. (See Ekeland,
Heckman, and Nesheim, 2002 and Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim, 2002).
From among the speci￿cations investigated we selected 15 to report here.
The speci￿cations are detailed in Tables A2 and A3. The tables list 5
speci￿cations. For each of these speci￿cations we allowed the parameter
λη1 = λε1 = λ to vary from 0.1, to 0.5, to 0.9.6 Thus there are 3 variations of
each of 5 speci￿cations. Speci￿cations 1 and 5 represent two extreme cases
and speci￿cations 2-4 represent linear combinations of those cases.
The price functions associated with each speci￿cation are depicted in
Figures 1-20. For each economy, we display the slope of the price function,
the population density at each location z, and the curvature of the price
function. Figures 1-10 show how the slope, the curvature, and the density
vary as λ varies from 0.5 to 0.9 to 1.0. Figures 11-20 show how the slope,
curvature, and the density vary as λ varies from 0.0 to 0.1 to 0.5. The ￿gures
largely tell the same story. When λ =0 .0 or 1.0, the slope is a straight
line, the curvature is constant, and the density is a normal density. However,
6The cases in which λ =0a n dλ = 1, the Tinbergen, normal-quadratic cases, are
displayed in the ￿gures for comparison.
42when λ =0 .1 or 0.9 the slope is not a straight line, the curvature is not
constant, and the density is not a normal density. These deviations from the
Tinbergen case are even stronger when λ =0 .5. The ￿gures also show that
the slope of the price function deviates most sharply from a straight line in
the two extreme cases, speci￿cation 1 and speci￿cation 5. All the ￿gures
show however, that the curvature deviates strongly from a constant when
heterogeneity is not normal. The closer the distribution of heterogeneity is
to normal, the closer the curvature is to a constant.
6.2 Model 1: Estimation results
The pictures described in the previous section show that there is nonlinearity
in the marginal price function and non-constancy in the curvature of the price
function when heterogeneity is not normally distributed in the population in
this quadratic model. The question remains, is that nonlinearity suﬃcient
to estimate the structural parameters in the model with precision? To shed
light on this question, we generated data from the 15 speci￿cations described
in the previous section and in Tables A2 and A3 and estimated the Model 1
43version of equation (23),
Pz (z)=−Bz + ν0 + ν
0
1y + η
We generated 100 datasets each of sample size 1000 for each speci￿cation
and then estimated the parameters B and ν1 using the technique discussed
in section 5.1. The results are displayed in Tables A4, A5, and A6. Table
A4 displays results for each of the 5 speci￿cations listed when λη1 = λε1 =
λ =0 .5. Table A5 displays results for each speci￿cation when λ =0 .9a n d
Table A6 displays results for each speci￿cation when λ =0 .1. The contrast
between Table A4 and Tables A5 and A6 give some indication of how much
the precision of the results deteriorate when the economy is closer to the
normal-quadratic Tinbergen economy which is not identi￿ed.
First consider the results in Table A4. The bias of the maximum likeli-
hood (ML) estimator is never larger than 0.04. The standard errors range
from 0.0349 in speci￿c a t i o n1t o0 . 2 8 7i ns p e c i ￿cation 4. Speci￿cations 3 and
4 have the highest standard errors. Looking at Tables A2 and A3, these are
the speci￿cations in which the two components of the mixtures of normals
distribution are most similar. That is, these are the two speci￿cations that
44are closest to being not identi￿ed.
T a b l eA 5a n dA 6i n v e s t i g a t eh o wt h er e s u l t si nT a b l eA 4c h a n g ew h e nλ =
0.9 and 0.1. In these cases, the distributions or worker and ￿rm heterogeneity
are closer to being normally distributed and the price function is closer to
being linear. In these cases, the ML results are essentially unchanged. The
bias of the ML estimator is the same order of magnitude. The biggest increase
is for speci￿cation 4 when λ decreases from 0.5 to 0.1. In this case, the bias
of the ML estimator increases from 0.02 to 0.12. This is still less than 7% of
the parameter value. The standard errors of the estimates increase slightly.
The biggest increase when λ increases from 0.5 to 0.9 is in speci￿cation 1
when the standard errors increase from 0.0349 and 0.0518 to 0.12 and 0.194.
This is nearly a four-fold increase. Yet the standard errors after the increase
are still only 12% and 20% of the parameter values.
The results indicate that the ML estimator can provide very good pa-
rameter estimates in a range of speci￿cations. These results apply to the
linear-quadratic model of Tinbergen with non-normal heterogeneity and to
the linear approximations of Brown and Rosen (1982). Far from not being
identi￿ed, the parameters are estimated with a high degree of precision.
456.3 Model 2: Simulation results
The results in Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2002) apply to additive mod-
els more general than the quadratic model. Model 2 generalizes Model 1 by
replacing the linear-quadratic terms in the production and utility functions
with nonlinear terms. Model 2 is detailed in Table A7. The speci￿cation
was chosen so that every function is a polynomial, ν (y) is strictly increas-
ing (ν1 > 0),θ(x) is strictly increasing (θ1 > 0), and mf (z) <m w (z)T h i s
last restriction rules out bunching. The speci￿cation allows the curvatures
of utility and preferences to be ￿exible and vary with z. It also allows for a
￿exible relation between preference heterogeneity ν (y)a n do b s e r v a b l e￿rm
traits y. While the power series representations detailed in Table A7 could
be replaced with orthogonal polynomial representations or representations
based on other basis functions, the power series representations were chosen
for ease of exposition.
It was more costly in terms of computer time to simulate equilibria and
generate data from model 2. We studied a more limited set of speci￿cations.
In particular 5 speci￿cations were chosen at random from a compact parame-
ter space. The ￿ve chosen are detailed in Tables A8 and A9. The parameters
that were allowed to vary across speci￿cations include β, ν1,µ η,σ η,α 0,α 1,
46µε, and σε. These parameters govern the curvature of the ￿rms￿ technology,
the minimum slope of ν (y), the mean and variance of unobservable ￿rm het-
erogeneity, the curvature of worker preferences, and the mean and variance
of worker heterogeneity.
Figures 21-30 display the slope of the price function, the curvature of
the price function, and the density of z for speci￿cations 1 through 5. For
each speci￿cation, three variations are plotted; one with λ =0 .5, one with
λ =0 .9, and one with λ =1 .0. Similar graphs depicting the case in which
λ =0 .0 and 0.1 are available from the authors upon request. Clearly a wide
variety of shapes of the price function are possible. In all cases, it appears
as if the price function might be well approximated by a quadratic or a
cubic but there are sharp deviations from these shapes. Simple quadratic
or cubic approximations to the price function would miss these important
deviations. Also, noteworthy is the shape of the equilibrium density of z.
In all the cases displayed, this density has many modes and is far from
being a normal density. In particular, this model is capable of generating
equilibria in which there are nearly gaps in the range of products marketed.
In ￿gure 21, the fraction of ￿rms demanding z<1 is positive and large,
the fraction demanding z ∈ (1,2) is nearly zero (though positive), and the
47fraction demanding z>2 is positive and large. This gap in the product range
re￿ects two factors, the distribution of heterogeneity in the population, and
the curvature of preferences and technology.
The value of λ does not appear to have large impacts on the slope, the
price, or the density. It does cause deviations in the shapes of these objects
but not large ones. This lack of impact is likely to be an artifact of the
set of speci￿cations investigated. In all speci￿cations, the distribution of
￿rm heterogeneity is determined by both the distribution of ν (y)a n dt h e
distribution of η. Because ν (y)i sa5 t ho r d e rp o l y n o m i a li ny,t h ev a r i a n c e
of ν (y) dominates the variance of η in all speci￿cations. Hence, η only
has small local eﬀects on the equilibrium and does not have large non-local
impacts. Nevertheless, the model is far from the normal model since ν (y)i s
far from being normal.
6.4 Model 2: Estimation results
Tables A10-A19 present the estimation results for model 2. Tables A10-A14
present results for speci￿cations 1 through 5 when λ =0 .5. Tables A15-A19
present results for the same speci￿cations when λ =0 .9. Results for the cases
where λ =0 .1 are omitted to economize on space. They are available from
48the authors upon request; they are largely similar to those presented.
In all the speci￿cations estimated the ML estimator again performs very
well. In Table A10 for instance the true value of β1 is 0.623. The average
estimate is 0.637. The bias is 2%. This degree of bias is typical of all pa-
rameters estimates across all speci￿cations. In all cases the bias has an order
of magnitude never larger than 0.03; in the range of 2-3% of the parameter
values. The standard error of the estimates of β1 in Table A10 is 0.243 or
39% of the parameter value. In percentage terms this standard error is the
fourth largest standard error for any parameter in any of the speci￿cations.
The other large standard errors are β1 in Table A15, and β1 in Tables A13
and A18. The largest standard error obtained is the standard error of the
estimate of β1 in Table A18 which is 0.405 or 63% of the true parameter
value. Standard errors for all other parameter estimates in all speci￿cations
are much lower than this. In Table A10 the second largest standard error in
percentage terms is the standard error on νc1 which is 0.256 or 13.8% of the
parameter value. Most of the standard errors in Tables A10 through A19
range between 5% and 20%.
Thus, the ML estimator performs very well. Despite the high degree
of nonlinearity in these additive models, the technique recovers parameter
49estimates with small bias and reasonable standard errors.
6.5 Model 3: Simulation and estimation results
When the data reject the additive speci￿cations above, alternative techniques
are required. Some techniques for estimating nonadditive models are devel-
oped in sections 4.2 and 5.2. To evaluate the small sample properties of
these estimators for economies where either the marginal utility function or
the marginal product function, or both, are nonadditive in the unobservable
characteristics, we consider an economy where workers diﬀer in the value
of the observable characteristic x and the unobservable characteristic ε. To
focus analysis on estimation of the utilit yf u n c t i o n sw eg e n e r a t eo b s e r v a t i o n s
from an economy with homogenous production technologies. The marginal
price function is given by the marginal product function. The speci￿cation
that we use is described in Table 1.
Table 1: Model 3 Functional Forms
Firm Technology Γ(z) Azα
Worker Utility U (z,x,ε) Bzβxβ−1εδ
Density of x fx (x) U [0.5,1.5]
Density of ε fε (ε) U [3.0,4.0]
50In this economy, pro￿t maximization by each of the homogenous ￿rms
implies that the ￿rst order condition:
Aαz
α−1 − Pz(z)=0
and the second order condition:
Aα(α − 1)z
α−2 − Pzz(z) ≤ 0
are satis￿ed. Since all the ￿rms have the same production technology, the
only possible equilibrium price function for this economy is given by
Pz(z)=Aαz
α−1.
This is an example of Rosen￿s 1974 argument that when one side of the
market is homogenous, the price function directly reveals parameters of that
side of the market.
The ￿rst order condition for utility maximization of a worker with char-
acteristics (x,ε)i s
Pz (z) − Bβz
β−1x
β−1ε
δ =0 ( 2 5 )
51and the second order condition is




Using the equilibrium price function, we get that the supply function of the
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To evaluate the estimators for the marginal utility of the workers obtained
using the estimators developed in Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2002),
we will simulate observations for pairs (x,z) generated by this supply function
and the speci￿cations described above for the distributions of x and ε. We
will require that for some strictly increasing function m
Uz (z,x,ε)=m(zx,ε).
The utility function described in Table 1 satis￿es this restriction. The true
function m is m(zx,ε)=βB(zx)
β−1 εδ. Assuming the true function is un-
known and assuming the true distribution of ε is unknown, we impose the
53normalization that, for all t within the relevant domain,
m(tx,t)=Pz (t).




W ec o u l dc h o o s ea n yv a l u ef o rx, and use a transformation to modify the
true marginal utility function m and the true distribution of ε to be within
the set of marginal utilities and distributions that are consistent with the
normalization imposed by our particular choice of x. However, for simplicity,
we choose the value of x and of the other parameters to be such that the true
function m and the distribution of ε are consistent with the normalization
generated by that x. Our choices for the parameters are
A α B β δ x
.55 .3 .15 1.1 -.8 1.
The equilibrium marginal price function for this economy is depicted with
a solid line in Figure 31. The dotted lines represent bounds on feasible
54marginal prices produced by the restriction that an equilibrium marginal
price must satisfy equation (25) for some (x,ε)a n d( x,ε) are elements of a
compact set.
Using these parameters and the derivations above we generated 100 in-
dependent samples each with 100 observations of (z,x) pairs. Using these
samples we estimated the distribution of ε, the workers￿ supply function
z = s(x,ε), and the marginal utility function m. To estimate the condi-
tional distribution of z given x, bandwidths were chosen by cross validation.
Figure 32 displays estimates of the distribution function of ε. In both
panels of the ￿gure, the solid line displays the true distribution function. The
dashed line displays an estimate. The dashed lines in the lower panel display
the median and average of the 100 estimates of the distribution function.
These track the true distribution function quite closely. The maximum gap in
the tails of the distribution is about 0.05. The maximum gap outside the tails
is negligible. The dotted lines in the panel plot the 5th and 95th percentile of
the estimates. The maximum gap between these two quantiles and the true
distribution function is about 0.2 . This graph shows that the nonparametric
estimate of the distribution function tracks the true distribution function very
well.
55Figures 33 and 34 plot the estimates of the supply function (26). The
upper panels display 3-dimensional graphs of this function. The lower panels
display cross sections of the function at particular values of x and ε. Figure 33
illustrates how well a single estimate of the supply function can do. Figure 34
illustrates the median and average estimate of the 100 independent estimates.
The dashed lines in the lower panels show that when ε =3 .45 or when
x =0 .62, the median and average estimates track the true supply function
with negligible error. The dotted lines depict the 5th and 95th percentile of
these estimates.
Finally, Figures 35 and 36 portray estimates of the marginal utility func-
tion. Figure 35 show how well a single estimate can do, showing the three
dimensional m(zx,ε) in the upper panels and the marginal utility m(zx,ε)
for ￿xed values of ε and zx respectively in the lower two panels. Figure
36 illustrates the average and median estimates as well as the 5th and 95th
percentile. When ε is ￿xed at ε =3 .45, the median and average estimates of
m(zx,3.45), plotted with dashed lines, track the true function with negligi-
ble error. Similarly when zx is ￿xed at zx =3 .56, the median and average
estimates are indistinguishable from the true function. Again, the dotted
lines show the 5th and 95th percentile estimates.
567C o n c l u s i o n
Much of previous analysis of hedonic models has neglected to consider the
strong implications imposed by equilibrium on the data generated from a
hedonic model. In particular, strong restrictions on preferences and tech-
nologies like additive separability impose a great deal of structure on the
joint distribution of observable random variables. In this paper, we have
developed these points in our discussion and illustrated them with two com-
putational examples. The graphical displays of equilibrium prices in the array
of models we consider demonstrate the strong nonlinearities that are generic
features of hedonic models. Nonlinearity in these models is not arbitrary, but
emerges quite naturally. This nonlinearity in conjunction with restrictions
like additivity allow for identi￿cation and estimation of the hedonic model.
In ￿nite samples of size 1000, the semiparametric maximum likelihood tech-
nique performs well in recovering estimates of structural parameters in both
the linear-quadratic model and in model 2 where the nonlinearities in the
structure of the economy are more severe. Finally, in model 3, with sample
sizes of only 100, the nonparametric techniques developed for nonadditive
models work very well.
The structural parameter estimates obtained in these exercises are cru-
57cial for any general equilibrium analysis that seeks to address the welfare
consequences of policy changes in hedonic markets. They are also crucial
for employing hedonic methods to correct cost of living indices for changes
in the characteristics of marketed goods. Without estimation of the struc-
tural parameters underlying a hedonic market, changes in the hedonic pricing
relationship are uninterpretable.
58Figure 1: Model 1, Speci￿cation 1: Slope of price function
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λ  =  0.9
λ  =  1.0
Figure 2: Model 1, Speci￿cation 1: Curvature of price function

































λ  =  0.5
λ  =  0.9
λ  =  1.0Figure 3: Model 1, Speci￿cation 2: Slope of price function
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Figure 4: Model 1, Speci￿cation 2: Curvature of price function

































λ  =  0.5
λ  =  0.9
λ  =  1.0Figure 5: Model 1, Speci￿cation 3: Slope of price function
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Figure 6: Model 1, Speci￿cation 3: Curvature of price function
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λ  =  1.0Figure 7: Model 1, Speci￿cation 4: Slope of price function
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Figure 8: Model 1, Speci￿cation 4: Curvature of price function
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λ  =  0.9
λ  =  1.0Figure 9: Model 1, Speci￿cation 5: Slope of price function
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Figure 10: Model 1, Speci￿cation 5: Curvature of price function
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λ  =  1.0Figure 11: Model 1, Speci￿cation 1: Slope of price function
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Figure 12: Model 1, Speci￿cation 1: Curvature of price function































λ  =  0
λ  =  0.1
λ  =  0.5Figure 13: Model 1, Speci￿cation 2: Slope of price function
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Figure 14: Model 1, Speci￿cation 2: Curvature of price function
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λ  =  0.1
λ  =  0.5Figure 15: Model 1, Speci￿cation 3: Slope of price function































λ  =  0
λ  =  0.1
λ  =  0.5
Figure 16: Model 1, Speci￿cation 3: Curvature of price function
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λ  =  0.1
λ  =  0.5Figure 17: Model 1, Speci￿cation 4: Slope of price function
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Figure 18: Model 1, Speci￿cation 4: Curvature of price function
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λ  =  0.5Figure 19: Model 1, Speci￿cation 5: Slope of price function
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Figure 20: Model 1, Speci￿cation 5: Curvature of price function
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λ  =  0.5Figure 21: Model 2, Speci￿cation 1: Slope of price function
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Figure 22: Model 2, Speci￿cation 1: Curvature of price function
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λ  =  1Figure 23: Model 2, Speci￿cation 2: Slope of price function
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Figure 24: Model 2, Speci￿cation 2: Curvature of price function
































λ  =  0.5
λ  =  0.9
λ  =  1Figure 25: Model 2, Speci￿cation 3: Slope of price function
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Figure 26: Model 2, Speci￿cation 3: Curvature of price function
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λ  =  1Figure 27: Model 2, Speci￿cation 4: Slope of price function
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Figure 28: Model 2, Speci￿cation 4: Curvature of price function
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λ  =  1Figure 29: Model 2, Speci￿cation 5: Slope of price function
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Figure 30: Model 2, Speci￿cation 5: Curvature of price function
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Figure 31: Model 3: Slope of price function 
 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 AT a b l e s
Table A1:
Model 1 functional forms
Firm Technology Γ(z,y,η) (ν0 + ν1y + η)z − Bz2
2














Worker Utility U (z,x,ε) (θ0 + θ1x + ε)z − Az2
2








(z,η,ε) are all scalars. y is of dimension ny and x is of dimension nx.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: βi,i=1 ,..,3a n dνcj,j=1 ,...,5 are the subset of structural
parameters of ￿rm technologies in Model 2 that are identi￿ed. β0, which
equals 1.0 in all speci￿c a t i o n si sn o ti d e n t i ￿ed. The parameters νcj satisfy
5 P
j=1






. 100 independent samples each of size 1000
were generated using the parameter values in Tables A8 and A9. In all speci-
￿cations, λη1 = λε1 =0 .5. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters
used to simulate the data. 100 independent estimates were obtained using the
maximum likelihood technique described in section 5.1. Column 2, labeled
￿ML￿, reports the averages and standard errors of these estimates.Table A11:



















Note: βi,i=1 ,..,3a n dνcj,j=1 ,...,5 are the subset of structural
parameters of ￿rm technologies in Model 2 that are identi￿ed. β0, which
equals 1.0 in all speci￿c a t i o n si sn o ti d e n t i ￿ed. The parameters νcj satisfy
5 P
j=1






. 100 independent samples each of size 1000
were generated using the parameter values in Tables A8 and A9. In all speci-
￿cations, λη1 = λε1 =0 .5. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters
used to simulate the data. 100 independent estimates were obtained using the
maximum likelihood technique described in section 5.1. Column 2, labeled
￿ML￿, reports the averages and standard errors of these estimates.Table A12:



















Note: βi,i=1 ,..,3a n dνcj,j=1 ,...,5 are the subset of structural
parameters of ￿rm technologies in Model 2 that are identi￿ed. β0, which
equals 1.0 in all speci￿c a t i o n si sn o ti d e n t i ￿ed. The parameters νcj satisfy
5 P
j=1






. 100 independent samples each of size 1000
were generated using the parameter values in Tables A8 and A9. In all speci-
￿cations, λη1 = λε1 =0 .5. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters
used to simulate the data. 100 independent estimates were obtained using the
maximum likelihood technique described in section 5.1. Column 2, labeled
￿ML￿, reports the averages and standard errors of these estimates.Table A13:



















Note: βi,i=1 ,..,3a n dνcj,j=1 ,...,5 are the subset of structural
parameters of ￿rm technologies in Model 2 that are identi￿ed. β0, which
equals 1.0 in all speci￿c a t i o n si sn o ti d e n t i ￿ed. The parameters νcj satisfy
5 P
j=1






. 100 independent samples each of size 1000
were generated using the parameter values in Tables A8 and A9. In all speci-
￿cations, λη1 = λε1 =0 .5. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters
used to simulate the data. 100 independent estimates were obtained using the
maximum likelihood technique described in section 5.1. Column 2, labeled
￿ML￿, reports the averages and standard errors of these estimates.Table A14:



















Note: βi,i=1 ,..,3a n dνcj,j=1 ,...,5 are the subset of structural
parameters of ￿rm technologies in Model 2 that are identi￿ed. β0, which
equals 1.0 in all speci￿c a t i o n si sn o ti d e n t i ￿ed. The parameters νcj satisfy
5 P
j=1






. 100 independent samples each of size 1000
were generated using the parameter values in Tables A8 and A9. In all speci-
￿cations, λη1 = λε1 =0 .5. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters
used to simulate the data. 100 independent estimates were obtained using the
maximum likelihood technique described in section 5.1. Column 2, labeled
￿ML￿, reports the averages and standard errors of these estimates.Table A15:



















Note: βi,i=1 ,..,3a n dνcj,j=1 ,...,5 are the subset of structural
parameters of ￿rm technologies in Model 2 that are identi￿ed. β0, which
equals 1.0 in all speci￿c a t i o n si sn o ti d e n t i ￿ed. The parameters νcj satisfy
5 P
j=1






. 100 independent samples each of size 1000
were generated using the parameter values in Tables A8 and A9. In all speci-
￿cations, λη1 = λε1 =0 .9. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters
used to simulate the data. 100 independent estimates were obtained using the
maximum likelihood technique described in section 5.1. Column 2, labeled
￿ML￿, reports the averages and standard errors of these estimates.Table A16:



















Note: βi,i=1 ,..,3a n dνcj,j=1 ,...,5 are the subset of structural
parameters of ￿rm technologies in Model 2 that are identi￿ed. β0, which
equals 1.0 in all speci￿c a t i o n si sn o ti d e n t i ￿ed. The parameters νcj satisfy
5 P
j=1






. 100 independent samples each of size 1000
were generated using the parameter values in Tables A8 and A9. In all speci-
￿cations, λη1 = λε1 =0 .9. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters
used to simulate the data. 100 independent estimates were obtained using the
maximum likelihood technique described in section 5.1. Column 2, labeled
￿ML￿, reports the averages and standard errors of these estimates.Table A17:



















Note: βi,i=1 ,..,3a n dνcj,j=1 ,...,5 are the subset of structural
parameters of ￿rm technologies in Model 2 that are identi￿ed. β0, which
equals 1.0 in all speci￿c a t i o n si sn o ti d e n t i ￿ed. The parameters νcj satisfy
5 P
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. 100 independent samples each of size 1000
were generated using the parameter values in Tables A8 and A9. In all speci-
￿cations, λη1 = λε1 =0 .9. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters
used to simulate the data. 100 independent estimates were obtained using the
maximum likelihood technique described in section 5.1. Column 2, labeled
￿ML￿, reports the averages and standard errors of these estimates.Table A18:



















Note: βi,i=1 ,..,3a n dνcj,j=1 ,...,5 are the subset of structural
parameters of ￿rm technologies in Model 2 that are identi￿ed. β0, which
equals 1.0 in all speci￿c a t i o n si sn o ti d e n t i ￿ed. The parameters νcj satisfy
5 P
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. 100 independent samples each of size 1000
were generated using the parameter values in Tables A8 and A9. In all speci-
￿cations, λη1 = λε1 =0 .9. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters
used to simulate the data. 100 independent estimates were obtained using the
maximum likelihood technique described in section 5.1. Column 2, labeled
￿ML￿, reports the averages and standard errors of these estimates.Table A19:



















Note: βi,i=1 ,..,3a n dνcj,j=1 ,...,5 are the subset of structural
parameters of ￿rm technologies in Model 2 that are identi￿ed. β0, which
equals 1.0 in all speci￿c a t i o n si sn o ti d e n t i ￿ed. The parameters νcj satisfy
5 P
j=1






. 100 independent samples each of size 1000
were generated using the parameter values in Tables A8 and A9. In all speci-
￿cations, λη1 = λε1 =0 .9. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters
used to simulate the data. 100 independent estimates were obtained using the
maximum likelihood technique described in section 5.1. Column 2, labeled
￿ML￿, reports the averages and standard errors of these estimates.References
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